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I. INTRODUCTION
The right to self-determination of peoples, alongside the equality of
nations, large and small, has been recognized as a basic norm of international
law. It is mentioned in the Charter of the United Nations,' and has been
afforded a special place of prominence in the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights' and in the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.3 It features prominently in the United Nations
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples of 19604 and the Declaration on Principles of International Law
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation among States in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations of 1970.' On the regional level, it has
been endorsed by no less than the Helsinki Final Act of 1975.6
II. THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION
There are few concepts in international law that have been distorted as
much as the right to self-determination in attempts to afford credibility to group-
* Johan D. van der Vyver is I.T. Cohen Professor of International Law and Human Rights at
Emory University School of Law.
1. U.N. CHARTER arts. 15 and 73 [hereafter U.N. Charter].
2. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1, 993
U.N.T.S. 3.
3. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1,999 U.N.T.S. 171.
4. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res.
1414, U.N. GAOR, 1 th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
5. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
Operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR,
25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
6. Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, para. VIII, 14 I.L.M. 1292
(1975).
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related aspirations. This is partly due to the fact that the right to self-determina-
tion over time acquired different shades of meaning that are not always clearly
distinguished or evaluated in their proper historical context.
The idea of a right to self-determination of peoples originally emerged
from socialist economic thought. Lenin (1870-1924) and Joseph Stalin (1879-
1953) invented the concept in the early parts of the twentieth century to explain
the standing of political communities within the over-arching and universal
economic structures of communism. 7  The prominence of the right to self-
determination in international law has been attributed to the American President,
Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924), whose Fourteen Point Address of January 8,
1918 has been cited as "transforming self-determination into a universal right."8
President Wilson included in those Fourteen Points one that proclaimed, "[a]
free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims,
based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such
questions of sovereignty the interests of the population concerned must have
equal weight with the equitable claims of government whose title is to be
determined." 9 This statement has come to be regarded as the basis of the
League of Nations policy for dealing with the subordinate communities of the
world empires that were defeated and dissolved through World War I.1°
The substance of the right to self-determination has not remained static.
In fact, four quite different meanings of the right to self-determination can be
distinguished, depending in each instance on the nature and disposition of the
peoples claiming that right."
7. According to Antonio Cassese, "the first forceful proponent of the concept [of self-
determination] at the international level" was Lenin. See A. CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES:
A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 15 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1995). Earlier, Joseph Stalin had written a detailed
pamphlet on self-determination, entitled: Marxism and the National Question (1913). See CASSESE, op. cit.,
at 14. But, according to Cassese, Lenin's Thesis on the Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-
Determination, published in March 1916, contained "the first compelling enunciation of the principle" of self-
determination of peoples.
8. Robert Friedlander, Self-Determination: A Legal-Political Inquiry, 1 MICH. ST. DCL L REV.
71, 73 (1975).
9. Fourteen Points Address delivered on January 8, 1918 to a joint session of Congress by
President Woodrow Wilson, Point 5. See 1 PUB. PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON: WAR AND PEACE, at 155-59
(eds. R.S. Baker & W.E. Dodd. New York/London: Harper & Brs. 1927).
10. V. VAN DYKE, HUMAN RIGHTS, THE UNITED STATES, AND WORLD COMMUNITY 86 (New York:
Oxford Univ. Press 1970).
11. See Johan D. van der Vyver, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Constitutional and International
Law, 5 EMORY INTL L. REV. 321, 395-416 (1991); Johan D. van der Vyver, Self-Determination and the
Peoples of Quebec, 10 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 14-19 (2000); JOHAN VAN DER VYVER, Self-Deter-
mination and the Right to Secession of Religious Minorities under International Law, in PROTECTION THE
HUMAN RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE 251,258-61 (Peter G Dachin & Elizabeth A.
Cole. eds., Colum. Univ. Press 2002); J.D. van der Vyver, Cultural Identity as a Constitutional Right in South
Africa, 14 STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 51, 53-56, 58 (2003).
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Initially, when World War I was drawing to a close, the idea of self-
determination of peoples was advanced to legitimize the disintegration of the
Ottoman, German, Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires," and within that
context the right to self-determination vested in "ethnic communities, nations
or nationalities primarily defined by language or culture" whose right to disrupt
existing States derived justification from its substantive directive:13 self-
determination here denoted the right of "peoples" in the sense of (territorially
defined) nations to political independence.' 4
Following World War II, the emphasis of the concept of self-determination
shifted to the principle "of bringing all colonial situations to a speedy end,"15 the
repositories of the concerned right in this sense were colonized peoples, and the
substance of their right denoted political independence "of peoples that do not
govern themselves, particularly peoples dominated by geographical distant
colonial powers."16
12. See A. CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 131-34 (Oxford: Clarendon Press
1986); Rupert Emerson, Self-Determination, 66 AM. J. INTL L. 459, 463 (1971); Friedlander, supra note 8,
at 71.
13. Nathaniel Berman, Sovereignty in Abeyance: Self-Determination and International Law, 7 WIS.
INT'L L.J. 51, 86-87 (1988).
14. It should be noted, though, that even then secession from existing empires was not a right in
itself. In the advisory opinion of the International Committee of Jurists in the Aaland Island Case it was
pointed out that "the right of disposing of national territory" was essentially an attribute of sovereignty and
that "Positive International Law does not recognize the right of national groups, as such, to separate
themselves from the State of which they form part by the simple expression of a wish, any more than it
recognizes the right of other States to claim such a separation." Report of the International Committee of
Jurists Entrusted by the Council of the League of Nations with the Task of Giving an Advisory Opinion upon
the Legal Aspects of the Aaland Islands Question, LEAGUE OF NATIONS 0. J. (Supp. 3) at 5 (1920). It was only
when "the formation, transformation and dismemberment of States as a result of revolutions and wars create
situations of fact which, to a large extent, cannot be met by applying the normal rules of positive law" that
"peoples" may either decide to form an independent State or choose between two existing ones. Id. at 6. In
such circumstances, when sovereignty has been disrupted, "the principle of self-determination of peoples may
be called into play": new aspirations of certain sections of a nation, which are sometimes based on old
traditions or on a common language and civilization, may surface and produce effects which must be taken
into account in the interests of the internal and external peace of nations. Id.
15. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 1, 31 (May 22); see also Legal Consequences for States of the
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16, 31 (June 21) (holding that the right to self-determination was appli-
cable to "territories under colonial rule" and that it "embraces all peoples and territories which 'have not yet
attained independence').
16. Berman, supra note 13, at 54. See also CASSESE, supra note 12, at para. 43, at 76; VAN DYKE,
supra note 10, at 87; Lynn Berat, The Evolution of Self-Determination in International Law: South Africa and
Namibia, and the Case of Walvis Bay, 4 EMORY INT'L L REV. 251, 283 (1990) (referring to self-determination
and the equal right of peoples as "twin aspects of decolonization"); Emerson, supra note 12, at 463; 0.
Schachter, The United Nations and Internal Conflict, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 401,
406-07 (J.N. Moore ed., John Hopkins Press 1974); G. Tesfagiorgis, Self-Determination: Its Evolution and
Practice by the United Nations and its Application in the Case of Eritrea, 6 WiS. INT'L L.J. 75, 78-80 (1987).
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In the 1960's, yet another category of "peoples" came to be identified,
namely those subject to racist regimes, and here the concept substantively
signified the right of such peoples to participate in the structures of government
within the countries to which they belong: 17 the "self' in self-determination was
no longer perceived to be territorially defined sections of the population in
multinational empires, and did not only comprise peoples under colonial rule or
foreign domination, but also came to be identified with the entire community of
a territory where the social, economic, and constitutional system was structured
on institutionally sanctioned racial discrimination.18
Finally, the right to self-determination has been extended to national or
ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities within a political community whose
particular entitlements are centered upon a right to live according to the tradi-
tions and customs of the concerned group. In terms of the Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, self-determination as currently perceived thus entails the
following principle: "In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic
minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the
right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own
culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own langu-
age.' 9
The Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic,
Religious and Linguistic Minorities similarly speaks of "the right [of national
or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities] to enjoy their own culture, to pro-
fess and practice their own religion, and to use their own language, in private
and in public, freely and without interference or any form of discrimination."20
17. The linkage within the confines of the right to self-determination of systems of institutionalized
racism and colonialism or foreign domination may be traced to the United Nations General Assembly's
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their
Independence and Sovereignty of 1965, in which the United Nations demanded of all States to respect "the
right to self-determination and independence of peoples and nations, to be freely exercised without any foreign
pressure, and with absolute respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms," and to this end proclaimed
that "all States shall contribute to the complete elimination of racial discrimination and colonialism in all its
forms and manifestations." Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the DomesticAffairs of States
and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp.
No. 14, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965).
18. This development was probably prompted by the claim of South Africa that the establishment
of independent tribal homelands as part of the apartheid policy constituted a manifestation of the right to self-
determination of the different ethnic groups within the country's African population. Not so, responded the
international community. The tribal homelands were a creation of the minority (white) regime and did not
emerge from the wishes, or political self-determination, of the denationalized peoples themselves.
19. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 3, at art. 27; see generally Felix
Ermacora, The Protection of Minorities Before the United Nations, IV RECUEIL DES COURs 246 (1983).
20. Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic
Minorities, G.A. Res. 47/136, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 210, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/135 (1992).
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The repositories of a right to self-determination are "peoples." According
to Yorum Dinstein, peoplehood comprises two elements: an objective
component, designated by the factual contingencies upon which the unity of the
group depends; and a subjective component, constituted by a certain state of
mind-the consciousness of belonging, and perhaps the will to be associated
with the group.2'
The concept of "peoples" is not territorially defined. On September 30,
1996, the Governor in Council of Canada referred numerous questions pertinent
to the secessionist policy of Quebec's ruling Party to the Supreme Court of
Canada for its opinion.2 Those questions included one inquiring whether or not
there is a right to self-determination under international law that would give the
National Assembly, legislature or government of Quebec the right to effect
secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally. The Canadian Supreme Court
for several reasons answered this question in the negative.23 It should be evident
to everyone that the inhabitants of Quebec, being composed of a variety of
ethnic or cultural, religious and linguistic population groups, do not constitute
a people as defined in international law, and for that reason alone cannot claim
a right to self-determination. Sections of the population of Quebec, united by
a common ethnic extraction, cultural heritage, religious affiliation, or linguistic
preference could of course lament the denial of their right to self-determination
on the grounds that they are not permitted to accede to a life-style dictated by
their national or ethnic, religious or linguistic identities. But that is defacto not
the case-at least not as far as (Francophone) Quebecois are concerned.
In virtue of the right to self-determination, governments, through their
respective constitutional and legal systems, are required to secure the interests
of distinct sections of the population that constitute minorities in the above
sense. The Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities clearly spells out that obligation:
protect, and encourage conditions for the promotion of, the concerned group
identities of minorities under the jurisdiction of the duty-bound State;24 afford
to minorities the special competence to participate effectively in decisions
pertinent to the group to which they belong;25 do not discriminate in any way
against any person on basis of his/her group identity,26 and in fact take action to
21. Yoram Dinstein, Collective Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities, 25 INT'L L. Q. 102, 103
(1976).
22. REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
23. Id.; see also van der Vyver, Self-Determination and the Peoples of Quebec, supra note 11.
24. Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic
Minorities, supra note 20, at arts. 1.1 and 4.2.
25. Id. at art. 2.3.
26. Id. at art. 3.
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secure their equal treatment by and before the law. The Declaration further
provides that, "[sitates shall take measures to create favorable conditions to
enable persons belonging to minorities to express their characteristics and to
develop their culture, language, religion, traditions, and customs, except where
specific practices are in violation of national law and contrary to international
standards. 28
It is submitted that the national-law limitation is to be conditioned by the
international-standards criterion: it presupposes municipal regulation that
remains within the confines of international standards and does not place undue
restrictions upon the group interests of minorities.
The Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of
National Minorities specified minority rights in much the same vein: it
guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the laws;29 States
Parties promise to provide, "the conditions necessary for persons belonging to
national minorities to maintain and develop their culture, and to preserve the
essential elements of their identity, namely their religion, language, traditions
and cultural heritage."3 States Parties recognize the right of persons belonging
to a national minority, "to manifest his or her religion or belief and to establish
religious institutions, organizations and associations," 31 and the Framework
Convention guarantees the use of minority languages, in private and in public,
orally and in writing. 32
Failure of national systems to provide such protection to sectional interests
of peoples within their area of jurisdiction, or merely the perception of being
marginalized, must be seen as an important contributing cause of the tireless
aspirations toward the establishment of homogenous States for sections of the
political community with a strong group consciousness: the Muslim community
of Kashmir, the Basques in Northern Spain, the Hindu factions in Sri Lanka, the
Catholic minority in Northern Ireland, the Christian community in Southern
Sudan, the Kurds in Iraq and Turkey, people of Macedonian extraction in
Florina (Northern Greece), and many others.
27. Id. at art. 4.1.
28. Id. at art. 4.2.
29. European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, art. 4.1., 1995 E.T.S.
157, reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 35 (1995).
30. Id. at art. 5.1.
31. Id. at art. 8.
32. Id. at art. 10.1; see also the European Charter for Regional Minority Languages, 1992 E.T.S.
148 (1992), available at www.conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/148.htm (last visited Feb. 18,
2004).
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ll. SELF-DETERMINATION AND A RIGHT TO SECESSION
It must be emphasized, though, that the right of peoples to self-determina-
tion does not include a right to secession.33 Not even in instances where the
powers that be act in breach of a minority's legitimate expectations. Three
compelling arguments are decisive in this regard:
" The right to self-determination is almost invariably mentioned
in conjunction with the territorial integrity of States, 34 and
reconciling the two principles in question necessarily means
that self-determination must be taken to denote something less
than secession.
" The right to self-determination vests in a people, while a new
State created through secession is essentially territorially
defined3" (it is a defined territory that secedes from an existing
State and not a people).36
" The right to self-determination is a collective group right
(entitlements included in that right can be exercised by individ-
ual members of the concerned group, either individually or
collectively) while a right to secede is an institutional group
right (where permissible, the decision to secede must be taken
by a representative organ of the territorially defined group on
behalf of the group as a whole).
General definitions of the right to self-determination, such as the one
contained in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples proclaiming the right of peoples to "freely determine
their political status" and the right to "freely pursue their economic, social, and
33. See VAN DYKE, supra note 10, at 88; Berman, supra note 13, at 87; Emerson, supra note 12,
at 464-65.
34. See, e.g., Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, supra note 6, at
arts. IV (territorial integrity) and VIII (equal rights and self-determination of peoples).
35. According to Hermann Mosler, "States are constituted by a people, living in a territory and
organized by a government which exercises territorial and personal jurisdiction." H. Mosler, Subjects of
International Law, VII ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 442,449 (R. Bernhardt ed., Elsevier,
North Holland 2000) (1984). Karl Doehring defined a State in international law as "an entity having exclusive
jurisdiction with regard to its territory and personal jurisdiction in view of its nationals." K. Doehring, State,
in X ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 423 (R. Bernhardt ed., 1987); Herman Dooyeweerd
defined the foundational function of a State in terms of "an internal monopolistic organization of the power
of the sword over a particular cultural area within territorial boundaries." H. DOOYEWEERD, III A NEW
CRITIQUE OF THEORETICAL THOUGHT 414 (1969) (maintaining that the leading or qualifying function of the
State finds expression in a public legal relationship which unifies the government, the people and the territory
constituting the political community into a politico-juridical whole). Id. at 433ff.
36. See Dinstein, supra note 21, at 109 (noting that peoples seeking secession must be located in
a well-defined territorial area in which it forms a majority).
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cultural development '" '37 should therefore not be seen as a general sanction of a
right to political independence but must be limited and understood in the context
of the subject-matter of the document from which they derive: peoples subject
to colonial rule or foreign domination do have a right to political independence;
national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities in an existing State do not.
The definition of self-determination in international instruments including in
that concept the right of peoples "freely [to] determine their political status and
freely [to] pursue their economic, social and cultural development" 38 was
similarly not intended to undermine the rule of international law proclaiming the
territorial integrity of States. The United Nations' 1993 World Conference on
Human Rights said it all when the right of peoples to "freely determine their
political status, and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural develop-
ment" was expressly made conditional upon the following proviso:
This [definition of self-determination] shall not be construed as
authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or
impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of
sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in com-
pliance with the principles of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples and thus possessed of a Government representing the whole
people belonging to the territory without distinction of any kind.39
The Supreme Court of Canada in a judgment pertaining to the legality of
cession from Canada of the province of Quebec 4 -should a majority of the
residents of that province through a referendum seek to effect the severance of
that territory from Canada-summarized as follows the distinction between self-
determination (referred to in the judgment as "internal self-determination") and
secession (referred to in the judgment as "external self-determination"):
37. Declaration on the Granting of independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, supra note
4.
38. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 2, at art. 1(1);
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 3, at art. 1(1); Declaration on the Granting
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, supra note 4, at art. 2. See also The Principle of Equal
Rights and Self-Determination of Peoples in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
supra note 5, at para. 5; Declaration on the Inadmissibility of intervention into the Domestic Affairs of States
and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, para. 5, G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess.,
Supp. No. 14, at 11-12, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965); Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation
in Europe, supra note 6, at art. VI.
39. World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 25 June
1993, art. 1.2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 157/24 (25 June 1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1661, at 1665 (1993).
40. See van der Vyver, supra note 11.
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The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to
self-determination of a people is normally fulfilled through internal
self-determination-a people's pursuit of its political, economic,
social and cultural development within the framework of an existing
state. A right to external self-determination (which in this case
potentially takes the form of a right to unilateral secession) arises in
only the most extreme of cases, and then, under carefully defined
circumstances.41
There are many compelling reasons why the destruction of existing
political communities harboring a plural society should be avoided at all costs:
a multiplicity of economically non-viable states will further contribute to a
decline of the living standards in the world community. The perception that
people sharing a common language, culture or religion would necessarily also
be politically compatible is clearly a myth, and disillusionment after the event
might provoke profound resentment and further conflict. Movement of people
within plural societies across territorial divides has greatly destroyed ethnic,
cultural, or religious homogeneity in regions where it might have existed in
earlier times, and consequently, demarcation of borders that would be inclusive
of the sectional demography which secessionists seek to establish is in most
cases quite impossible. Affording political relevance to ethnic, cultural, or
religious affiliation not only carries within itself the potential of repression of
minority groups within the nation, but also affords no political standing
whatsoever to persons who, on account of mixed parentage or marriage, cannot
be identified with any particular faction of the group-conscious community, or
to those who-for whatever reason--do not wish to be identified under any
particular ethnic, religious or cultural label. In consequence of the above, an
ethnically, culturally, or religiously defined State will more often than not create
its own "minorities problem," which-because of the ethnic, cultural or
religious incentive for the establishment of the secession State-would almost
invariable result in profound discrimination against those who do not belong,
or worse still, a strategy of "ethnic cleansing."
Secession is indeed sanctioned by international law-not under the rubric
of a right to self-determination but as a permissible political strategy in its own
right. The restructuring of national borders is sanctioned by international law
in two instances only: (a) if a decision to secede is "freely determined by a
people" 42 -that is, a cross-section of the entire population of the State to be
41. REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC, supra note 22, at para. 1R6.
42. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Opera-
tion Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, supra note 5. Providing, under the
heading, "'The Principle of Equal Rights and Self-Determination of Peoples:" "The establishment of a
sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an independent State or the
2004]
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divided and not only inhabitants of the region wishing to secede; and (b) if,
following an armed conflict, national boundaries are redrawn as part of the
peace treaty.43 On the first basis alone, could the United Nations find peace
with the reunification of Germany, the break-up of the Soviet Union,44 and
parting of constitutional ways of the Czech Republic and Slovakia.4' The
secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia exemplifies the second principle. The
disintegration of the former Yugoslavia represents a complicated conglomera-
tion of both principles.'
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION
The primary responsibility to secure the right to self-determination of
national or ethnic, religious or linguistic sections of the population within a
political community vests in the legislative and executive authorities of the
State. Failure of a government to secure that right can possibly provoke the
following responses within the international community of States.
Should the Security Council of the United Nations be persuaded that denial
of the right to self-determination to a people, and the responses of that people,
take on such proportions as to constitute a threat to international peace and
security, it can, pursuant to powers vested in it by Chapter VII of the UN
Charter, take a decision to that effect and mandate action to bring an end to the
situation at hand as it may find expedient, including sanctions of all kinds and,
emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people constitute modes of implementing the
right to self-determination by that people."
43. See CASSESE, supra note 12, at 359-63.
44. It should be specially noted that the USSR Constitution expressly guaranteed the right of each
Republic to secede from the Union. SSSR [Constitution] art. 72, available at
http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/77consO3.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2004).
45. Lee Buchheit specified, as elements for legitimizing secession in any given case, that the section
of a community seeking partition should possess a distinct group identity with reference to, for example,
cultural, racial, linguistic, historical or religious considerations; those making a separatist claim must be
capable of an independent existence, including economic viability (but bearing in mind international aid
programs that might help a newly established political entity over its teething problems); and the secession
must serve to promote general international harmony, or at least not be disruptive of international harmony
or disrupt it more than the status quo is likely to do. LEE BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-
DETERMINATION 228-38 (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press 1978).
46. The Constitution of Yugoslavia authorized secession of its constituent republics. F.R. YUGO.
(1946) art. 1; see also F.R. YUGO. para. I, Introductory Part (Basic Principles) (1963) (depicting Yugoslavia
as "a federal republic of free and equal peoples and nationalities" united "on the basis of the right to self-
determination, including the right of secession"); and id. at art. 1; F.R. YUGO., para. I, Introductory Part (Basic
Principles) (1974) (referring to "the right of every nation to self-determination" and "the brotherhood and
unity of nations and nationalities"). However, the disintegration of the federation did not occur in accordance
with the procedures prescribed for the exercise of the constitutional right to secession, and furthermore
included territorial gains through conquest and ethnic cleansing.
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in extreme circumstances, even armed intervention.47 Relying on the Security
Council to take action would require quite exceptional circumstances. The
Security Council does not readily invoke its Chapter VII powers, its punitive
powers can only be applied to States, and the five Permanent Members (China,
France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) can exercise their
power of veto in the Council to protect themselves or their allies from
condemnation and retributive action.
If denial of the right to self-determination constitutes a consistent pattern
of gross and reliably attested violation of human rights and fundamental
freedoms, the matter may be taken under advisement by the Human Rights
Commission under the public procedure provided for in Resolution 1235 of
1967 of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations4 8 or the
confidential procedure provided for in Resolution 1503 of 1970 of the
Economic and Social Council.49 All Member States of the United Nations are
subject to the procedures provided for in ECOSOC Resolutions 1235 and 1503
since those procedures stem from the solemn pledge of Member States, in terms
of Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter, "to take joint and separate action in co-
operation with the [United Nations] Organization" for the achievement of
"universal respect for and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction based on race, sex, language or religion. 5°
The proceedings can be set in motion by any person or group of persons who
can be reasonably presumed to be victims of "a consistent pattern of gross and
reliably attested violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms," or who
has direct and reliable knowledge of such violations. 5' A complaint can also be
lodged with the Secretary-General of the United Nations (to be transmitted to
the Human Rights Commission) by a non-governmental organization (NGO)
acting bona fide in accordance with recognized principles of human rights,
which does not entertain political stands hostile to the principles contained in
the UN Charter, and which has direct and reliable knowledge of such
violations.5 2 The procedures are aimed at persuading the culprit State to desist
from the offensive action, and can also prompt the appointment of a special
rapporteur to investigate and report on the situation prevailing in the defendant
State.
47. U.N. CHARTER, supra note 1, at arts. 39-42.
48. Economic and Social Council Resolution 1235 (XLII), 42 U.N. ESCOR, 42d Sess., Supp. No.
1, at 17, U.N. Doc. E/4393 (1967).
49. Economic and Social Council Resolution 1503 (XL VIII), 48 U.N. ESCOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No.
1A, at 8, U.N. Doc. E/4832/Add.1 (1970).
50. U.N. CHARTER, supra note 1, at art. 56 (read with art. 55(c)).
51. SUB-COMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIEs,
24th Sess., Res. 1 (XXIV), at 50-51, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1070 (1971).
52. Id.
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States Parties to an international covenant or convention may be subject to
procedures designed to bring their violations of the treaty provision relating to
self-determination to a peaceful settlement, but subject to the constraints
applying to the particular covenant or convention. However, procedures
provided for in international instruments for accosting States that violate the
right to self-determination of a people under their jurisdiction provide cold
comfort to victims of such violations. The Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights only makes provision for periodic reports of States Parties on
measures adopted and progress made in achieving the rights enunciated in the
Covenant.53 The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights entails a similar
reporting obligation, 54 but also contains facultative provision for an inter-state
adversarial procedure55 and under its First Protocol in addition makes provision
for an individual complaint procedure.56 The United States has submitted itself
to the inter-State adversarial procedure5 7 but has not ratified the First Protocol.
Should denial of the right to self-determination amount to the intentional
and severe deprivation of fundamental human rights contrary to international
law by reason of the political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, or
gender-based18 identity of the group or collectivity, or on other grounds that are
universally recognized as impermissible under international law, the individual
responsible for the deprivation may possibly be prosecuted in the International
Criminal Court for the crime of persecution,59 or in a national court with power
to exercise universal jurisdiction in the particular case. 6°
The exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC is subject to all kinds of limitations.
The Court's jurisdiction may be triggered by the Security Council of the United
Nations, a State Party, or the Prosecutor acting proprio motu. 6' The exercise of
jurisdiction by the ICC in cases of Security Council referrals are not subject to
53. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 2, at art. 16.
54. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 3, at art. 40.
55. Id. at art. 41.
56. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. GAOR, 31st
Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316, (1976).
57. 138 CONG. REc. 4783, para 111(3) (1992).
58. The ICC Statute defines "gender" as "the two sexes, male and female, within the context of
society. The terms 'gender' does not indicate any meaning different from the above." This, rather silly,
definition was inserted in the Statute as a compromise with the Holy See and certain Arab States with intent
to preclude the persecution of Gays and Lesbians from the reach of ICC jurisdiction.
59. Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7(l)(h), read with art. 7(2)(g), U.N. Doc.
AICONF. 183/9 (1998), reprinted in 37 LL.M. 1002 (1998) [hereafter ICC Statute].
60. Drafters of the ICC Statute operated under a resolve to include within the subject-matter of the
ICC only crimes designated as such in customary international law, and one may therefore safely assume that
the crimes over which the ICC can exercise jurisdiction are indeed customary-law crimes and therefore subject
to universal jurisdiction.
61. ICC Statute, supra note 59, at art. 13.
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further constraints,62 but a Security Council referral can be vetoed by any of its
Permanent Members. In cases of State Party referrals, there is a further con-
straint: the ICC can only exercise jurisdiction in the matter if the State of which
the perpetrator is a national (the national State) or the State on whose territory
the crime was allegedly committed (the territorial State) has either ratified the
ICC Statute, or has on an ad hoc basis agreed to the exercise of jurisdiction by
the ICC in the particular case under investigation.63 Investigations conducted
by the Prosecutor proprio motu are also only feasible if the national State or the
territorial State has either through ratification of the ICC Statute or a special
declaration agreed to the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC. But here, yet a
further constraint applies: the decision of the Prosecutor to conduct an
investigation must be approved by a three-judge Pre-Trial Division of the ICC.65
The United States has not ratified the ICC Statute. It is bound to veto a
Security Council referral accosting an American national of acts of persecu-
tion.66 If an American national were to be suspected of persecution in a country
other than the United States and that other country has either ratified the ICC
Statute or has agreed on an ad hoc basis to the exercise of jurisdiction by the
ICC in the particular case under investigation, then that person can be
prosecuted in the ICC, provided the ICC can lawfully acquire custody of the
suspect.67 If there is an extradition treaty in place between the United States and
that other State, the latter is given a judicial discretion to either extradite the
perpetrator to the United States or to surrender him or her for trial in the ICC,
taking into account the respective dates of the request for extradition and the
request for surrender to the ICC, the fact that the perpetrator is an American
citizen, and the nationality of the victim(s) of the crime.68 Unconditional
preference is given to status-of-forces agreements mandating a State where
American troops have been deployed to surrender any of those troop to stand
trial in the United States for crimes committed in the other State. 69 The United
62. However, the Security Council cannot confer powers on the ICC that the ICC does not have by
virtue of its Statute. The ICC can, for example, only prosecute persons over the age of 18 years, it only has
jurisdiction in respect of crimes committed after July 1, 2002, it cannot exercise jurisdiction while a State with
a special interest in the matter is willing and able to investigate the alleged crime and, if appropriate, bring the
perpetrator to justice. The Security Council cannot instruct the ICC to deviate from any of these restrictions.
63. ICC Statute, supra note 59, at arts. 12(2) and (3).
64. Id.
65. Id. at arts. 15(3) and (4).
66. American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2002, 22 U.S.C. 7401 (2002).
67. The duty to cooperate with the ICC to bring the perpetrator of a crime within the Court's
jurisdiction is based, in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, on state consent. ICC
Statute, supra note 59, at arts. 86, 87(l)(a), 89(1).
68. Id. at art. 90(6).
69. Id. at art. 98(2).
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States can in all cases foreclose the exercise of jurisdiction over any of its
nationals by self-conducting a bonafide investigation into the alleged crime.70
As far as ICC jurisdiction is concerned, it is in the present context
important to note that cultural genocide--deliberate efforts of persons in
authority to destroy a particular culture-is not included in the concept of
"genocide" as a crime that can be prosecuted in that tribunal.71 The definition
of "genocide" in the ICC Statute72 is founded on the one in the Convention on
the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,73 and that definition
cannot be extended by the ICC through analogical interpretation.74 A proposal
to include cultural genocide in the Convention definition of "genocide" was
deliberately rejected by the ad hoc Committee on Genocide responsible for its
drafting.75 Furthermore, the only category of acts of genocide under which
cultural genocide could possibly come into play is the one consisting of
deliberately inflicting on an ethnical group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part. "Physical destruction" is not
an element of any of the other enumerated instances of genocide and must
consequently be given a definite meaning in the context of deliberately
inflicting on a group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction. "Physical destruction" means the destruction of the group by
causing the death of members of the group. Destroying a culture without killing
members of the group united by a common cultural extraction does not fall
within the ordinary meaning of "physical destruction".
76
V. CONCLUSION
It is the sovereign right of States to regulate their internal affairs in
accordance with national predilections, but States ought to do that within the
70. Id. at art. 17(1).
71. See contra, Kai Ambos & Steffen Wirth, Genocide and War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia
Before German Criminal Courts, in INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROSECUTION OF CRIMES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 769, 792-93 (Horst Fishcher, et al. eds., Berlin Verlag:
Arno Spitz GMbH 2001); Steffin Wirth, The Subjective State of Affairs of Genocide-A Destruction, Intention
and Expulsion Crime, in 28 ARGUMENT AND MATERIALS TO THE TIME EVENTS 59, 62 (Munich: Academy
and Politics for Time Events 2001).
72. ICC Statute, supra note 59, at art. 6.
73. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9 1948, art. 2,
78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1948).
74. ICC Statute, supra note 59, at art. 22(2).
75. See U.N. C-AOR, 6th Comm., 3d Sess., 83d mtg. at 206, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.83 (1948).
76. See, e.g., Steven R. Ratner, The Genocide Convention After Fifty Years, 92 AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L.
PROC. 1, 2 (1998); Julio Barboza, International Criminal Law, 278 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 59 (1999); van der
Vyver, Cultural Identity as a Constitutional Right in S. Afr., supra note 11, at 64-66.
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confines of their obligations under international law.77 As far as the right to
self-determination of peoples is concerned, the United States has a fairly good
record, but not one that is entirely beyond reproach.
In 1998, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Religious Freedom,
Prof. Abdelfattah Amor of Tunisia, conducted an informal investigation in the
United States into compliance in this country with the subject-matter of his
brief.78 Although the state of religious freedom in the United States is by and
large satisfactory, the Special Rapporteur found causes for concern in this
regard in respect of members of the Arab community being singles out for
special scrutiny at airports (which is not a matter of self-determination) and
insensitivity of American authorities to the spiritual values of Native Americans
(which does implicate the right of Native Americans as a people to self-
determination).79
The right to self-determination recognizes in broad outline the fact of
ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic diversities within a political community
(pluralism) as a salient fact that ought to be accommodated in the political
structures and legal arrangements of the State. However, it is equally important
that group alliances based on a common ethnic extraction, cultural heritage,
religious conviction, or linguistic identity ought not to be afforded a role within
the body politic beyond the distinctive attribute that constitutes the bond
between members of the group.
It is of the essence of the right to self-determination that the relevance of
group interests is to be cut down the size, dictated by the nature of the group.
The protected interests of a cultural group are to be confined to cultural
interests, of a religious group to matters of religion, and so on. To afford
political representation in the structures of government to a cultural or a
religious group, would amount to affording to those latter modalities that
qualify the group a pertinence beyond the confines of its true (and useful)
destination in the aggregate of human society.
Enforcement of the right to self-determination through international
mechanisms is problematic, but not hopeless. Existing retributive procedures
by and large culminates in no more than international condemnation. However
one should not underestimate the long-term potential of international censure
77. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 27, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(stating that "a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform
a treaty").
78. The visit to the United States was "informal" because the American government declined to
invite Prof. Armor to conduct an investigation in the United States. He came to the country as the guest of
several NGOs and was offered the facilities of a number of Law Schools to conduct an in loco investigation.
79. Report Submitted by Mr. Abdelfattah Amor, Special Rapporteur in accordance with Commission
on Human Rights Resolution 1998/18, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 55th Sess., Agenda Item l1(c),
Addendum, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/58/Add.1 (1998).
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for bringing recalcitrant States to their senses. International reprobation seldom
renders immediate results, but if the condemnation remains widespread and
pressures persist, they are bound to have effect in the long run. Governments
do not like to be seen to be violators of international standards of human rights
protection.
